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a b s t r a c t 
Shale gas has grown to become a major new source of energy in countries around the globe. While its importance 
for energy supply is well recognized, there has also been public concern over potential risks from hydraulic 
fracturing (‘fracking’). Although commercial development has not yet taken place in the UK, licenses for drilling 
were issued in 2008, signalling potential future development. This paper examines whether public fears about 
fracking affect house prices in areas that have been licensed for shale gas exploration. Our estimates suggest 
differentiated effects. Licensing did not affect house prices but fracking the first well in 2011, which caused 
two minor earthquakes, did. We find a 3.9–4.7 percent house price decrease in the area where the earthquakes 
occurred. The earthquakes were too minor to have caused any damage but we find the effect on prices extends to 
a radius of about 25 km served by local newspapers. This evidence suggests that the earthquakes and newspaper 










































The advent of cost-reducing technological innovations associated
ith hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling has propelled shale gas
o become one of the most promising and viable new global sources of
nergy. With the discovery of large reserves around the world, shale gas
an support global energy needs for decades. The US Energy Informa-
ion Administration estimated in 2012 that United States natural gas re-
ources will last for up to 87 years and the British Department of Energy
nd Climate Change suggested in 2013 that Britain has enough shale gas
eposits to supply the UK for about 25 years. In the US, a shale gas boom
as boosted property values, domestic energy supplies and the profits
f producers ( Boslett et al., 2016; Feyrer et al., 2017 ). At the same time,
hale gas development has raised concerns about externalities (i.e., en-
ironmental, disamenity, and other costs borne by nearby landowners
nd other stakeholders besides the drilling company). 1 During the ex-
raction process, large amounts of high-pressure water and additives are☆ We thank Lin Fan and Esther Lho, for excellent research assistance and seminar p
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1 Bartik et al. (2019) still report a positive net-effect for the US. 
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094-1190/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access ased to fracture the rock layer and release embedded shale gas. The wa-
er is transported by trucks, thus raising concerns about noise, road dam-
ge and accidents due to increased traffic ( Balthrop and Hawley, 2017;
ilman et al., 2013; Muehlenbachs and Krupnick, 2014 ). Increased air
ollution may result from this truck traffic and from drilling operations
 Colborn et al., 2014; Caulton et al., 2014; Roy et al., 2014 ). Moreover,
here is a risk of soil or water contamination caused by metals, radioac-
ive and saline wastewater, or by the added chemicals used to treat the
ells ( Olmstead et al., 2013; Warner et al., 2013; Fontenot et al., 2013 ).
ore recently, there have also been rising concerns about seismic activ-
ty induced by gas exploration ( Koster and van Ommeren, 2015; Cheung
t al., 2018; Ferreira et al., 2018; Metz et al., 2017 ). In the US, these
osts may be compensated to some degree, with many US households
wning the rights to their underlying minerals and receiving offsetting
ease payments. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study fracking outside the
S. Specifically, we look at the impact of prospective hydraulic fractur-
ng for shale gas in the UK. The UK – and in fact all other countries –articipants at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Bristol, the 2016 
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iffer in two important ways from the US in that (i) there is no royalty-
ased compensation for the costs of shale gas extraction as all subter-
anean petroleum is owned by the Crown since the 1934 Petroleum Act, 2 
nd (ii) commercial shale gas extraction has not yet begun, although
etroleum Exploration and Development Licenses (PEDLs) grant the right
o explore for shale gas or coal bed methane. Licenses awarded in the
K in 2008 mention shale gas exploration projects for the first time. 3 
his change allows us to take a closer look at individuals’ expectations
and fears) about shale gas development. 
To assess expectations, we employ regression methods and look at
hether the new information provided by licensing (i.e. PEDLs assigned
n 2008) was capitalized in house prices. Buying a house is a significant
nancial commitment and buyers will likely consider the expected costs
nd benefits of shale gas extraction. While our setup does not allow us
o disentangle the expected costs and benefits separately, we aim to
btain unbiased estimates of the expected net local effects of potential
uture shale gas extraction. To this end, we exploit detailed informa-
ion on every house transaction in the years before and after the 2008
ound of licensing. This allows us to compare changes in house prices in
he licensed area to changes in the prices of comparable houses outside
hat area in a difference-in-differences procedure. The approach controls
exibly for all time-invariant local attributes (observed or unobserved)
hat might be correlated with licensing and house prices. Moreover, the
esign also controls for all time-varying characteristics through the use
f control locations. These control areas are chosen such that they are
ikely to be similar to the licensed areas in terms of the unobservables
hat determine the supply of licenses (and potentially prices). These con-
rol group definitions are: (i) areas bordering the newly licensed areas;
ii) areas that are not close to the newly licensed areas, but are licensed
or exploration in a future round of licensing in 2014, (iii) areas that
ere already licensed before 2008 and so were locations where any net
osts and benefits would be already capitalised; and (iv) areas where ge-
logical surveys suggest shale gas deposits. Comparison of impacts using
ontrol areas close to the treatment areas in (i) and further away from
he treatment areas in (ii) allows us to assess whether our estimates are
hreatened by spillovers from treatment to proximate control areas and
iolation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). 4 We
urther address the possibility that licensed areas may have experienced
rends different from those in non-licensed areas with a triple-difference
trategy in which we compare license areas where license holders ex-
licitly mentioned shale gas exploration to license areas where shale
as exploration was not mentioned explicitly. 2 While individual homeowners in the UK will not receive royalty payments 
rom shale development as they do in the US, the UK Onshore Oil and Gas 
ndustry’s Community Engagement Charter promises approximately £100,000 as 
 community benefit per well site where hydraulic fracturing takes place, plus 
ne percent of the future production revenue ( Walsh et al., 2011 ). Moreover, 
he industry commits to make a voluntary one-off payment of £20,000 for the 
ight to use deep-level land for each unique horizontal well that extends by more 
han 200 m. These payments are voluntary but the government reserves powers 
o make these payments compulsory if firms fail to volunteer. 
3 Exploration implies drilling a test well to get accurate estimates of the re- 
overable shale resources. If firms want to go beyond the exploration stage and 
ctually frack a well, this will require the landowners’ consents, planning per- 
issions from the local community, permits from the environmental agencies, 
ositive reviews form the Health and Safety Executive, and permission from the 
epartment of Energy and Climate Change (see DECC 2015b for details). Note 
hat the 2015 Infrastructure Act provides automatic access to deep-level land 
elow 300m for the purpose to exploit petroleum or deep geothermal energy by 
ydraulic fracturing. As a result, operators do not need access rights from every 
ndividual landowner whose land is drilled under at a depth below 300m. 
4 Our main concern is selective siting. Concerns that licensing had hetero- 
eneous effects on home buyers’ perceptions of the probability to experience 
racking in the future across the four control groups are not supported by google 






















2 Our estimates show that licensing itself did not affect house prices.
nly when exploratory hydraulic fracturing caused seismic activity do
e observe statistically significant negative effect on house prices. Af-
er Cuadrilla – one of the companies involved in UK shale gas explo-
ation – hydraulically fractured the first well in the UK near Blackpool,
wo small earthquakes of magnitude 2.3 and 1.5 on the Richter scale
ere detected by the British Geological Survey in February and May
011. These were very minor earthquakes, of a magnitude which would
ot have caused any structural damage, although some residents re-
orted noticeable shaking of windows and furniture. 5 Earthquakes of
his magnitude are not uncommon in the UK, but subsequent investiga-
ions and a well-publicized report, showed that these earthquakes were
ery probably caused by hydraulic fracturing. Focusing on those areas
here hydraulic fracturing likely caused seismic disruption in 2011, we
ee a pronounced negative effect on house prices. Depending on the
ontrol group specification, we estimate negative house price effects
hat range between 3.9 to 4.7 percent following the incidents in 2011.
istance decay specifications show that the effects are centered on the
arthquake site and decay rapidly with distance, but there are residual
mpacts in licensed areas up to 25km away. Importantly, this 25km ra-
ius largely overlaps with the circulation area of local newspapers from
he earthquake area and additional estimations suggest that the house
rice drop after the earthquake occurs along the (fuzzy) border of the
ewspaper area. These border effects demonstrate the important im-
act of information transmission on expectations in property markets;
n particular, econometric evidence of property market impacts out to
he edge of a boundary determined by newspaper circulation highlights
he important role of media in hedonic modeling. Moreover, these me-
ia effects are not fleeting – we show that the shock to house prices
n the earthquake region persisted after 2011, suggesting that fear of
racking-induced seismic activity is not a temporary phenomenon. 
Our paper addresses topics relevant to different strands of the lit-
rature. Most relevant is the literature on the property value im-
acts of seismicity induced by oil and gas operations. These pa-
ers include Koster and Van Ommeren (2015) , Metz et al. (2017) ,
erreira et al. (2018) , and Cheung et al. (2018) . Koster and Van Om-
eren (2015) look at earthquakes induced by conventional gas devel-
pment in the Netherlands; the other papers focus on wastewater in-
ection arising from shale gas development in Oklahoma. All of these
apers find a reduction in house prices of 2–5% resulting from induced
eismicity. 6 
Our paper is also relevant for the literature analyzing the exter-
al costs of shale gas development ( Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2013;
ames and James, 2014; Muehlenbachs et al., 2015 ). Other work has
ound mixed results with respect to these costs, sometimes finding evi-
ence of net benefits ( Bennett and Loomis, 2015; Delgado et al., 2016;
eber et al., 2016; Boslett et al., 2016 ). In the US context, property
alue impacts of shale gas development may be mixed because of the
ubstantial royalty payments that can be accrued by property owners
ho choose to lease their land. In the UK, mineral rights reside with
he crown, making the situation similar to the case of “split estate ” in
he US, where rights have been severed from the property by a previ-
us owner. A number of papers have studied the impact of shale gas
evelopment on split estates, generally finding evidence of negative ef-
ects ( Kelsey et al., 2012; Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Weber and Hitaj, 2015;
rown et al., 2019 ). 
Finally, we relate to a stream of literature that examines the impact
f new information, e.g. about nearby toxic releases, on housing market
ransactions ( Moulton et al., 2012; Mastromonaco, 2015; Ma, 2019 ).5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-12930915 
6 A related literature has examined the housing market impact of nat- 
rally occurring earthquakes Brookshire et al. (1985) ; Naoi et al. (2009) ; 
ingh (2019) and disasters such as nuclear accidents ( Huang et al., 2013; 
oulomb and Zylberberg, 2016 ), floods ( Gallagher, 2014; McCoy and Zhao, 
018 ), and wildfires ( McCoy and Walsh, 2018; Garnache and Guilfoos, 2018 ). 


















































































































7 The UK case where property rights are not in private hands also applies 
to other countries in Europe. Looking more closely into the prevalence of one 
or the other regime, it turns out that the US case where private individuals 
own most subsurface minerals is unique Gaille (2015) . The differences in min- 
eral ownership originate from the civil law and common law system and later 
amendments. Ironically, the US legislation dates to historical UK legislation be- 
cause the crown did not reserve any subsurface minerals in its original land 
grants which then carried through to the colonies’ grants to settlers. The 1934 
Petroleum Act changed the legislation and ruled that the Crown should own the 
subterranean petroleum rights in the UK. US legislation did not change. For a 
review of the historical origins of the legal differences, we refer the reader to 
Campbell (1956) . 
8 Appendix Fig. A1 illustrates the relationship between the water volume used 
for fracking the well and the observed seismic activity in a diagram published 
by the BGS. articularly relevant for the interpretation of the newspaper effects is
ernstein et al. (2019) which presents evidence for climate risk dis-
ounts in house prices as a response to (global) news about sea level rises
or a subset of informed investors. Bakkensen and Barrage (2017) ratio-
alize this in a model with heterogeneous buyers who value this new
nformation differently. Snyder and Strömberg (2010) show that local
ariation in press coverage affects citizens’ knowledge. 
In the remainder, Section 2 provides background information on
hale gas development in the UK, followed by a detailed data description
n Section 3 and a description of the estimation method in Section 4 . We
resent our results on the 13 th licensing round in Section 5 , discuss the
ouse price impacts of expected seismic activity in Section 6 , and draw
onclusions in Section 7 . 
. Shale gas development in the UK 
Gas and oil exploration in the UK is licensed by the government ev-
ry few years at the so called Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing rounds. In
hese licensing rounds, 10km × 10km blocks of land are offered for po-
ential exploration and development. Exploration and production (E&P)
ompanies can apply for a license to drill exploration wells in one or
ore of these blocks (with only one well per block). These Petroleum
xploration and Development Licenses (PEDLs) allow the holder to “search
or, bore and get hydrocarbons ” subject to access rights, planning per-
ission, environment and health & safety permits. Historically, these
icenses were granted for conventional oil and gas exploration. How-
ver, the rise of new horizontal drilling technologies that propelled
he shale gas boom in the US led the Department of Energy and Climate
hange (DECC) to identify areas in the east and south of England as hav-
ng potential for shale gas development in 2007. Subsequently, in the
3 th licensing round in 2008, unconventional gas exploration using hy-
raulic fracturing technology became a new option. By 2014, the only
ompanies that had drilled shale gas exploration wells were Cuadrilla
esources, IGas and Third Energy but there has been no commercial
xtraction. 
The 14 th Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing Round was launched on 28
uly 2014 and closed on 28 October 2014. According to the Oil & Gas
uthority (OGA), “a total of 95 applications were received from 47 com-
anies covering 295 Blocks. Following scrutiny of each applicant’s com-
etency, financial viability, environmental awareness and geotechnical
nalysis, and following the decision not to award licenses in Scotland
nd Wales, 159 blocks were taken forward for further consideration. ”
n 17 December 2015, the OGA announced that 159 license blocks were
ormally offered under the 14 th round. We do not look at the house price
mpacts of this licensing round in our main specification but utilize the
reas offered as a control group for areas offered in the 13 th licensing
ound in one part of our estimation strategy. Fig. 1 maps existing license
locks from previous licensing rounds (Panel A), newly licensed blocks
n the 13 th licensing round in 2008 (Panel B) and blocks that were for-
ally offered to firms in the most recent 14 th licensing round in 2014
Panel C). 
Shale gas development is considered a promising energy strategy in
he UK for several reasons. First, it can contribute to energy security,
educing the UK’s reliance on offshore gas and imported gas. Second,
t is thought to support the UK’s attempted transition to a low-carbon
conomy as it emits less 𝐶𝑂 2 than oil or coal. If shale gas replaced these
lternative energy sources it could have a positive effect on the UK’s
arbon footprint. Third, developments in the US show that commercial
rilling can have significant economic benefits not only with respect to
ossible independence from fossil fuel but also for the local communi-
ies where the drilling sites are located. DECC (2013) suggests that “UK
hale gas production would be a net benefit to public finances, could
ttract annual investment of £3.7 billion and support up to 74,000 jobs
irectly, indirectly and through broader economic stimulus. ” Given re-
orts about booming fracking regions in the US, the prospect of an eco-3 omic stimulus might have stimulated house price growth in licensed
reas. 
One important difference to the US is that home owners in the UK
annot expect royalty payments because mineral rights are owned by
he Crown. 7 However, there are potentially some direct local payments.
he UK Onshore Oil and Gas Industry (UKOOG) agreed in their 2013
ommunity Engagement Charter to pay £100,000 to local communities
ituated near exploratory well sites regardless of whether or not recov-
rable deposits are found. On top of that, they promised 1 percent of
roduction revenues to communities during the production stage, which
ay amount to £5-10m per well over a period of 25 years. Finally, the
ndustry confirmed a voluntary one-off payment of £20,000 per hori-
ontal well to local communities in return for the right to use deep-level
and that extends by more than 200 m. We do not expect these schemes
o be capitalized in house prices during our study period for three rea-
ons. First, we look only at housing transactions up to 2014 and fracking
elated events in 2008 and 2011 which occurred before these payments
ere offered. Secondly, only one well has been fracked and a few addi-
ional wells drilled in the UK during this period, and the first (and as far
s we can see only) payment of £100,000 made was in August 2017 by
uadrilla (see below). Thirdly, the expectation of future payments may
ot be capitalized in house prices because they are not formally guar-
nteed (though such payments could be made compulsory if companies
ail to volunteer) and because they are paid to the community instead
f the individual landowner. For community payments to be capitalized
n house prices, house buyers would probably need more information
bout the exact benefits of community projects. 
Cuadrilla was the first company to receive a license for shale gas
xploration along the coast of Lancashire (the hatched red area in the
orth-west of Figure 1). In August 2010, they started hydraulically frac-
uring the well Preese Hall 1, which is located near Blackpool. This was
he first time that a well had been fracked with modern, high-volume
echniques in the UK. On 1 April 2011, the British Geological Survey
BGS) reported an earthquake of magnitude 2.3 on the Richter scale
ear Preese Hall 1. Following this event, Cuadrilla installed local seis-
ometer stations around the exploration well that did not observe any
urther seismic activity. On May 26 th , Cuadrilla resumed hydraulic frac-
uring and only 10 hours later, the BGS reported another earthquake of
agnitude 1.5 on the Richter scale. Following these events, Cuadrilla
nnounced on 31st May 2011 a halt due to unstable seismic activity
 De Pater and Baisch, 2011 ). Cuadrilla then commissioned a series of
eomechanical studies to investigate the connection between the seis-
ic events and the hydraulic fracturing operations. 
The reports concluded that the observed seismic activity “was caused
y direct fluid injection into an adjacent fault zone during the treat-
ents, but that the probability of further earthquake activity is low ”
 Green et al., 2012 ). A subsequent official UK government report ac-
nowledged that hydraulic fracturing caused the seismic activities. 8 De-
pite that, the report did not recommend stopping further operations but
ather called for careful monitoring of seismic activities around frack-
S. Gibbons, S. Heblich and C. Timmins Journal of Urban Economics 122 (2021) 103313 
Fig. 1. PEDL blocks from onshore oil and gas licensing rounds. The figures show PEDL blocks that were licensed in licensing rounds before 2008 (Panel A), in the 
13th licensing round in 2008 (Panel B), and blocks that were formally offered in the 14 th round in 2014 (Panel C). Cross-hatched areas in Panel B indicate blocks 
where shale gas development was mentioned in the license application and the red triangle indicates Preese Hall 1 where the earthquake happened. Shaded areas 
indicate regions with shale gas potential according to the British Geological Survey (BGS). Note that Output Areas are not perfectly nested in license blocks which 





































































g  ng wells. Subject to stricter rules, the Secretary of State announced on
3 December 2012 that exploratory hydraulic fracturing for shale gas
ould resume in the UK. However, there were no further wells being
racked during this licensing period, partly because local communities
elayed or blocked the planning permission process. Subsequently, af-
er our study period, Cuadrilla fracked two other wells in Lancashire, in
018 and 2019, both of which resulted in similar earthquakes to those in
011. For a more detailed discussion of the politics of shale gas and the
nti-fracking movement, see Keeler (2015) , and for a recent summary
f fracking in England see Davies (2019) . 
. Data 
Housing transaction data were taken from the Land Registry Price
aid Data provided by the UK government for England and Wales. The
ata go back to 1995, but we restricted the data to the period between
he first quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2014 for the purpose
f this research. The data include information on the sales price, four
roperty types – detached, semi-detached, terraced or flat/maisonette –
hether the property is new, and whether it is sold on freehold or lease-
old basis. Housing transactions are mapped into 2001 Census Output
reas and aggregated to mean output area-by-quarter cells. 9 Output
reas (OA) are Census geographical zones with approximately 110–
40 households. We exclude from the sample, Output Areas in the top
uartile of the population density distribution and in major and minor
onurbations, because these concentrated areas are likely inner-city ar-
as which are fundamentally different (possibly in unobservable ways)
rom the rural areas where drilling tends to happen. We further drop
ll observations that are in the top and bottom percentiles of transac-
ion prices. This leaves us with a panel of quarterly sales at the level
f 92,663 Output Areas. The panel is unbalanced because we do not
bserve sales for every Output Area in every quarter. Appendix Table
1 provides descriptive statistics of our data separated by license area,
eriod, and the respective control groups. 
We supplement the land registry data with property sales data from
he Nationwide building society, which covers about 15 percent of the




4 andom since it is limited to buyers who need a mortgage but it al-
ows us to test the effect of additional house characteristics including
oor area, the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, housing tenure and
hether the house comes with a garage or not. Further socio-economic
haracteristics at the output area level are taken from the 2001 Census.
Information on the areas licensed under the 13 th and 14 th licensing
ound are published by the UK Oil and Gas Authority. These data include
etailed information on the licensing blocks, the proposed exploration,
nd the companies that hold licenses. The data further include informa-
ion from the British Geological Survey on areas whose geology renders
hem promising for shale gas development. We use these data to deter-
ine whether Output Areas are within the licensed area and whether
he license covers shale gas development. 
We complement the administrative data with a number of control
ariables that account for the geographic location of an output area.
hese involve interactions between year and four elevation categories
 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 25 𝑚 ; 25 𝑚 < 𝑒 ≤ 50 𝑚 ; 50 𝑚 < 𝑒 ≤ 100 𝑚 ; 𝑒 > 100 𝑚 ), the log of dis-
ance to the coast, and the log of distance to the next center with 1,000,
0,000, and 50,000 inhabitants. These interactions capture time varia-
ion in the importance of terrain differences and the amenity value of
eing close to the coast or close to urban centers. 
Finally, we collect information on the circulation areas of the follow-
ng six local newspapers: Blackpool Gazette, Blackpool Reporter, Fleetwood
eekly News, Garstang Courier, Lancashire Evening Post , and Lytham St.
nnes Express . We define local newspapers as those with a circulation
rea which covers the Preese Hall 1 well site and define their coverage
rea as all postcode sectors in which at least 100 copies are sold around
011 (postcode sectors are postal zones with around 7,000 residents on
verage). Appendix Fig. A3 shows the circulation areas for all six news-
apers. 
. Estimation strategy 
Our aim is firstly to estimate if and by how much house prices are
ffected when the area in which a house is located is licensed for shale
as exploration and is thus exposed to potential future shale gas devel-
pment. There are two fundamental challenges to this exercise: (i) li-
ensing might not occur randomly and (ii) PED licenses are not limited
o unconventional shale gas exploration. 
S. Gibbons, S. Heblich and C. Timmins Journal of Urban Economics 122 (2021) 103313 
Fig. 2. Control Group Specifications. The 
Figure shows the four different control 
group definitions. The red outlines indicate 
blocks that were licensed under the 13th 
round in 2008 and the shaded areas mark 
the respective Output Areas that comprise 
the control group.. (For interpretation of 
the references to colour in this figure leg- 
end, the reader is referred to the web ver- 







































10 Unreported specifications where we use smaller distance buffers lead to very We start with the concern that places offered, chosen and licensed
or oil and gas exploration are selected for their potential productivity
nd may therefore differ from unlicensed areas on many dimensions.
he licensing decisions may also be influenced by planning consider-
tions and the potential impacts on local residents. Both of these con-
iderations imply that house prices may be different in licensed and
nlicensed areas, for reasons other than a causal effect of licensing on
rices. To address these problems and assess how licensing an area
as affected house prices, our baseline approach involves regression-
ased difference-in-differences (DiD) methods that compare the average
hange in property prices before and after the 13 th licensing round to the
verage house price change in a comparison group. To make this com-
arison group more similar to the areas licensed for gas exploration, we
onsider four geographical definitions to determine control areas where
he trend should closely resemble that in licensed areas. We think of
his exercise as a cross-validation where each control group provides in-
ights into the relative importance of potential sources of bias. The four
ontrol areas are mapped in Fig. 2 , Panels A-D. 
Our first control group in Panel A is composed of areas that are
roximate to the licensed areas but not inside those areas. Specifically,e draw a 20km buffer around all licensed areas and restrict our esti- s
5 ations to the area that is licensed and the surrounding 20km. 10 The
trategy should reduce potential effects from unobserved heterogene-
ty between license areas and the control group. One concern with this
trategy is that areas that are licensed for shale gas development may
ffect bordering areas negatively (e.g., if expectations about future truck
raffic were to spill over into neighboring communities); alternatively,
pillovers might be positive if shale gas is expected to stimulate the lo-
al economy and create new jobs ( Feyrer et al., 2017 ). Expectations that
icensing could extend outward from the currently licensed area might
lso lead to spatial spillovers. To account for that, we consider a second
pecification where we use the area that was offered under the future
4 th licensing round but we exclude all areas that overlap with the 20km
uffer used in specification (1). Note that we restrict the end of our ob-
ervation period to mid-2014 when the 14 th licensing round started. The
orresponding area covered by this control group is mapped in Panel B.
anel C presents a control group specification where we use all existing
icense areas. Prior to the advances in drilling technology that made hy-imilar results. 











































































































12 In the robustness checks, we compare this to an alternative specification 
where we deflate house prices with an annual price index instead of flexible 
time trends. 
13 Put differently, we start with 𝜌𝑠 , 𝜌𝑒 , 𝛾𝑙 , 𝛾𝑠 , 𝛾𝑒 = 0 . 
14 We will present additional specifications were we use property transaction 
data from Nationwide Building Society that allow us to control for further house 
attributes. 
15 The regions are North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, North West, East 
Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, South East, South West, Wales, London. 
16 Wards are sub-authority areas from electoral geography. In our sample with- 
out restrictions to a specific control group, we observe on average 13 census raulic fracturing lucrative, license holders engaged in conventional oil
nd gas exploration. With the rise of hydraulic fracturing technologies,
xisting PED licenses could also be used for unconventional shale gas
xploration. However, while a license grants exclusivity to the holder
ithin the licensed area, it does not imply a right to drill a well. Initial
eismic investigations can be undertaken but further steps towards ex-
loration and exploitation require consent from the national authority
ECC and an additional planning permission from the relevant Min-
ral Planning Authority (MPA). One can therefore think of the already
icensed areas as regions where some consent for oil and gas develop-
ent has been granted. Using them as a control group therefore accounts
or unobserved effects that are specific to areas that get licensed. While
ED licenses allow shale gas exploration (conditional on consent from
he national and local authorities), exploration will only happen in ar-
as with the right underlying geology. To account for that, we exploit
he exogenous assignment of geology to create a fourth control group
hat allows us to compare licensed and non-licensed areas with the same
nderlying geology that is promising for shale gas development (Panel
). Information on geological features that are promising for shale gas
evelopment stems from the British Geological Survey. This strategy
ccounts for unobserved license area effects and it also accounts for ge-
logical specificities. For instance, if the underlying shale rock implied
etter (or worse) natural amenities we would face a bias if these ameni-
ies had time-varying effects that were captured in house prices. 
The second concern arises because PED licenses also cover conven-
ional gas exploration methods which have been used for almost 50
ears and are less likely to be of concern in terms of the potential for
roundwater contamination, air pollution, and other local disamenities.
s a result, combined estimations that consider licenses for conventional
nd unconventional exploration jointly may be biased towards zero. To
ccount for that, we exploit additional information provided by DECC
n the type of exploration project to identify a separate effect for areas
here shale gas exploration was explicitly mentioned in the license ( 𝑠 )
ith 𝑠 ⊆ 𝑙. This is not to say that areas where shale gas was not explic-
tly mentioned are excluded from shale gas exploration but we expect
ndividuals to be less informed about it. 
Lastly, we want to distinguish two events, the 2008 licensing round
here fracking has become an option and the fracking-induced earth-
uake that happened in a subset of shale gas licensed areas ( 𝑒 ) with 𝑒 ⊆ 𝑠
n the third quarter of 2011. 11 To incorporate this information, we rely
n a triple-difference model with two events, licensing and earthquake,
cross the three geographical treatment areas: PED licensed areas ( 𝑙);
ED license areas where the license mentions shale gas ( 𝑠 ); and PED
icense areas where the license mentions shale gas and the earthquake
ccurred ( 𝑒 ). One beneficial feature of the triple-difference model is that
t controls for license-area-specific trends. For instance, if licensed areas
ere environmentally less attractive or economically less vibrant, we
ould expect them to follow a different house price trend. As a result,
e rely less on the choice of control groups. 
While our main concern is selective siting, one may be concerned
hat the choice of different control groups comes at the cost of increased
eterogeneity among home buyers. To the extent that these are time-
nvariant differences, this would be covered by the fixed effects. A re-
aining concern is that licensing might have changed home buyers’ per-
eptions of the probability to experience fracking in the future deferen-
ially in the control groups. In this case, each control group would give
s a different estimate depending on how much the 2008 licensing event
hifted individuals’ expectations about future fracking events in the con-
rol groups. We believe this concern is of second order importance be-
ause google trend shows virtually no interest in fracking before the
arthquake event (see Appendix Fig. A2). Put differently, fracking was
ot considered a disamenity in 2008 and therefore, we have no reason11 Note that the third quarter of 2011 is the first quarter after the second earth- 






6 o believe that it had different effects on individuals’ expectations. After
he earthquake event, expectations might have changed deferentially
ut this does not affect our estimate of the earthquake or shale-license
ffect because our triple-difference specification controls for trends in
ther licensed areas. 
We estimate variations of the following equation between the first
uarter (Q1) of 2005 and the second quarter (Q2) of 2014: 
𝑛𝑃 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡 + 
∑
𝑗∈( 𝑙,𝑠,𝑒 ) 
𝜌𝑗 ⋅ 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖,𝑗 × 𝟙 𝑡>𝑄 1 , 2008 
+ 
∑
𝑗∈( 𝑙,𝑠,𝑒 ) 
𝛾𝑗 ⋅ 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖,𝑗 × 𝟙 𝑡>𝑄 2 , 2011 + 𝑋 𝑖𝑡 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
he dependent variable is the log of the mean property transaction price
bserved in Census Output Area 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡 . Across all specifications,
e include output area-specific constants ( 𝛼𝑖 ) that absorb time-invariant
rea characteristics and quarter-by-year specific constants ( 𝑘 𝑡 ) to allow
or flexible time trends. 12 
The coefficients 𝜌𝑗 on the interaction of an indicator for the three
ypes of geographical treatment areas ( 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖,𝑗 ) with an indicator for
he period after the licensing event ( 𝟙 𝑡>𝑄 1 , 2008 ) quantifies the average
ouse price effect after licensing across the three geographical treatment
reas. Similarly, coefficient 𝛾𝑗 quantifies the average house price effect
fter the earthquake in the third quarter of 2011 ( 𝟙 𝑡>𝑄 2 , 2011 ) across the
hree geographical treatment areas. Note that the components of the
nteraction terms and all other interactions are controlled for by the
utput area and time fixed effects. When we estimate Eq. 1 , we start
ith a simple difference-in-differences model for post-2008 licensing
ffects and then gradually augment our model. 13 
𝑋 𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of covariates including sets of control variables for
he proportion of sales of detached, semi-detached, and terraced houses
r flat/maisonette. 14 Beyond that, we interact year dummies with (i)
our elevation groups ( 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 25 𝑚 ; 25 𝑚 < 𝑒 ≤ 50 𝑚 ; 50 𝑚 < 𝑒 ≤ 100 𝑚 ; 𝑒 >
00 𝑚 ) to capture time-varying terrain differences (this might be a con-
ern if shale-geology is correlated with surface geology); (ii) the log of
istance to the coast as well as the log of distance to the next center
ith 1,000, 10,000, and 50,000 inhabitants to allow for changes in the
aluation of proximity to the coast or centers; and (iii) indicators for
0 regions to allow for differing and flexible house price trends across
egions over time. 15 These controls along with the output area fixed
ffects, should capture unobserved geographic differences that simulta-
eously affect the (un)attractiveness of an area and the availability of
hale gas. Across all specifications, standard errors are clustered on the
ard level. 16 
. Results 
.1. Baseline 
Table 1 presents our baseline specifications for the four control group
efinitions described above. Panel A uses as a control group a 20kmutput areas per ward. Alternative specifications where we allow for common 
hocks within larger spatial units do not change our results. We present specifi- 
ations where we cluster standard errors on the level of travel to work areas in 
he robustness checks. In our sample, the average travel to work area nests 477 



























































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: 20km Buffer Panel B: Offered 14th Licensing Round without 20km Buffer 
After 2008 ∗ License Area -0.008 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 ∗ ∗ -0.008 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 ∗ ∗ -0.004 ∗ ∗ 0.002 0.008 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.008 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 ∗ 0.003 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area -0.007 ∗ ∗ 0.004 ∗ 0.007 ∗ ∗ 0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale -0.031 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.021 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 -0.009 ∗ ∗ 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.003 -0.031 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.028 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.001 -0.015 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.003 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.067 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.010 -0.068 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.032 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.095 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.035 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.086 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.046 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Observations 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 756,248 756,248 756,248 756,248 756,248 756,248 
R-squared 0.815 0.817 0.815 0.817 0.815 0.817 0.799 0.802 0.799 0.802 0.799 0.802 
Geo and Region Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Panel C: Licenses issued pre-2008 Panel D: Geology 
After 2008 ∗ License Area -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005 ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005 ∗ 0.001 -0.000 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area -0.001 0.002 0.018 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale -0.031 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.021 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.003 -0.006 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.003 -0.029 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.023 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 -0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.007 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.000 0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.002 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.067 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.005 -0.066 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.003 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.092 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.048 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.092 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.125 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.041 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Observations 517,580 517,580 517,580 517,580 517,580 517,580 513,063 513,063 513,063 513,063 513,063 513,063 
R-squared 0.825 0.828 0.826 0.828 0.826 0.828 0.818 0.821 0.818 0.821 0.818 0.821 
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
The table reports results from fixed effects regressions of log price on an interaction between an indicator for time which either indicates the post-license period (after 2008) or the post-earthquake period (after 2011) 
and an indicator for (i) licensed areas, (ii) areas licensed for shale gas exploration, or (iii) areas licensed for shale gas exploration where the earthquake happened. All regressions are conditional on quarter-by-year 
fixed effects, house controls, and output area fixed effects. Even column numbers additionally control for region-by-year fixed effects and geographic characteristics (elevation categories, distance to coast and centers) 
interacted with year dummies. Panel A uses all output areas within a buffer of 20km around the licensed areas as control group. Panel B uses the 14 th licensing round areas as control group but exclude the 20km buffer 
around the licensing area. Panel C uses all Output Areas that were licensed under previous rounds as control group. Panel D uses Output Areas where the underlying geology makes shale gas development more likely 
to happen. Output areas in the top quartile of the population density distribution and minor and major urban centers are excluded from all specifications. The time horizon is Q1/2005-Q2/2014. Standard errors are 
clustered on the ward level. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10 
7
 



















































































































18 The bias-adjusted treatment effects compare the post-2011 coefficient for 
earthquake areas in the baseline in column 1 with the corresponding coeffi- 
cient from a model with additional controls (the respective column), scaled 
by the change in 𝑅 2 . The exact formula is 𝛽∗ ≈ 𝛽 − 𝛿[ ̊𝛽 − 𝛽] 𝑅 𝑀𝑎𝑥 − ̃𝑅 
?̊? − ̃𝑅 
. Following 
Oster (2019) we assume 𝛿 = 1 and 𝑅 𝑀𝑎𝑥 = 1 . 3 ×𝑅 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐4 where 𝑅 2 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐4 is the 𝑅 
2 uffer around the area licensed under the 13 th licensing round. The con-
rol group in Panel B is the area under consideration for the 14 th licensing
ound minus the 20km buffer in Panel A. In Panel C, we present specifi-
ations with areas that were licensed under previous rounds as a control
roup. Finally, in Panel D, we use information on the underlying geol-
gy to distinguish between areas where shale gas development is more
r less likely to happen. 17 
We present two specifications of our regressions. The first one con-
ains a baseline set of controls that merely accounts for flexible time
rends (quarter-by-year dummies), output area fixed effects, and basic
ouse attributes (share of four property types, share of new properties
nd the share of properties sold as freehold) and a second one where
e additionally control for geographic control variables interacted with
ear dummies to allow house prices to vary with the geographic loca-
ion of an output area (four elevation categories, log of distance to the
oast, distance to the next center with 1,000, 10,000, and 50,000 in-
abitants). We include these geographic control variables, because the
eology that makes shale gas development more likely and makes ar-
as susceptible to earthquakes, may also give rise to desirable environ-
ental amenities which affect house price trends (distance to coast and
ttractive scenery). Finally, we add region-by-year effects to allow for
exible price trends across ten broad regions. For example, this will
ccount for different price trends in the Weald Basin south of London
here the Jurassic shales were expected to hold some shale gas. 
Our baseline specification in columns 1 and 2 is a simple difference-
n-differences, where the coefficient of interest tells us whether licensed
reas experienced a house price drop in the post-period from the second
uarter of 2008 till the second quarter of 2015. Among licensed areas,
e distinguish all licenses granted in 2008 ( License ), a subset of licenses
here shale gas development was mentioned ( Shale ) and within the lat-
er group those areas where the earthquake happened ( Earthquake ). The
stimated coefficient on licensed areas after 2008 is small and ranges be-
ween a positive effect of 1.1 percent and a negative effect of 0.8 percent
cross Panels A–D. By contrast, we see a persistently negative effect af-
er 2008 for those regions where shale gas development was mentioned.
he effects indicate negative house price effects between 2.9 and 3.1
ercent. In column 2, we extend our set of control variables and we find
imilarly small house price effects between 0.4 and 1.1 percent in the
icensed areas overall and negative house price effects between 2.1 and
.8 percent in the areas where shale gas development was mentioned. 
In columns 3 and 4, we split the after-period up and allow for a differ-
nt effect in licensed areas after the first instance of hydraulically frac-
uring a well in the UK resulted in two earthquakes. Doing so shows that
he negative effect in areas where shale gas development was mentioned
s driven by the one area where shale gas development took place and
aused seismic activities. Accounting for the full set of controls, those ar-
as where the first hydraulic fracturing attempt caused two earthquakes
n 2011 faced a negative house shock after 2011 that ranges between
.5 and 4.8 percent while the effect in licensed areas and licensed areas
here shale gas was mentioned is negligible. 
Finally, in columns 5–6, we present our preferred specification where
e additionally include after-2008 interactions for the earthquake re-
ions and after 2011 for the non-earthquake regions. The specification
n column 6 with the full set of controls suggests that the negative house
rice effects were predominantly driven by the time after the seismic
ncidents in 2011 and it is restricted to the earthquake region. Our es-
imates suggest that house prices in the earthquake area fell after 2011
y 3.9–4.7 percent. 
There are a few potential concerns with the pattern of coefficients in
hese results. First, the inclusion of control variables has a pronounced17 Appendix Table A3 presents an alternative specification where we choose 
o sample restriction and Appendix Table A2 presents an specification where 
e omit all non-licensed areas. In unreported specifications, we also considered 






8 ffect on the coefficient of interest. To shed more light on this, Appendix
able A4 shows specifications where we include the control variables
ne by one. Looking at the coefficient of interest, it turns out that the
nclusion of output area fixed effects and quarter-by-year trends hikes
p the 𝑅 2 but the estimated earthquake effect does not change much
ompared to the baseline specification without controls. We observe the
ame for the inclusion of house controls and flexible geographic controls.
nly the inclusion of region-by-year controls decreases the size of the
ffect. Given the North-South divide in the English housing market, the
ensitivity of the estimates is to be expected. House prices in the south
re systematically higher and on different trends, so we have to account
or this heterogeneity in the control group. Therefore, Appendix Table
5 presents an alternative specification where we condition the baseline
n region-by-year fixed effects. We then add the output area fixed effects
nd other control variables, calculating the bias-adjusted treatment ef-
ect for the earthquake areas after 2011 as suggested in Oster (2019) to
erify that the parameter estimate is not unduly sensitive to the inclusion
f these controls. 18 Our estimated coefficients are very similar to the
ias-adjusted treatment effect and we conclude that unobserved hetero-
eneity is not a major concern. We further observe a slight price-uplift
n the licensed areas overall in 2011, although this coefficient is small
nd only significant in panels B and D after including all controls. Given
he absence of any credible explanation for the earthquake generating
enefits in other licensed areas, we suspect this coefficient is simply cap-
uring a spurious price trend. Lastly, there is some indication that house
rices in the earthquake area might have started to fall after 2008 which
ould point to a negative effect of drilling and fracking that is indepen-
ent of the seismic activities. However, since this interpretation is only
upported by Panel B we do not consider it conclusive. 
For ease of interpretation, we summarize the effects from the full
pecification in Column 6 for the four control group specifications and
he after-2008 (light bars) and after-2011 (dark bars) period in Fig. 3 .
he figures illustrate a pronounced and fairly similar earthquake effect
fter 2011 while there is no evidence of negative effects in licensed areas
r shale areas. Unlike the other Panels, Panel B suggests a pronounced
egative house price effect of 3.2 percent in the earthquake areas, point-
ng to some difference between our control region specifications. How-
ver, this does not affect our conclusions that seismic activity was the
ain driver of the sharp drop in house prices after 2011. 19 
Overall, these results suggest that shale gas exploration was only
erceived as a disamenity as a result of the earthquake, and in the ar-
as where the earthquake took place. Another interpretation is that the
arthquake raised people’s awareness of shale gas exploration and the
otential risks – but only in proximity to the location where the incident
appened. In line with the interpretation that the earthquake raised
eople’s awareness of fracking, Appendix Fig. A2 shows that Google
earches for the terms “fracking ” and “shale gas ” in England only started
hen the earthquake triggered massive media attention. 20 In the follow-
ng, we will test the robustness of our findings and take a closer look at
he effect in proximity to the earthquake location in an attempt to un-
erstand the underlying drivers. rom the fully specified model in column 4 of each Panel. 
19 Appendix Table A6 presents the results from our preferred specification in 
able 1 , column 6 in levels instead of logs. 
20 Unfortunately, there is no spatial variation in Google searches before the 
nd of our observation period in 2014. Looking at search results after 2014, 
e observe the highest interest in “fracking ” or “shale gas ” in large cities and 
layton-le-Woods which is located inside the earthquake regions. 
S. Gibbons, S. Heblich and C. Timmins Journal of Urban Economics 122 (2021) 103313 
Fig. 3. Estimated Effects. The Figure shows the estimated effects for the coefficients in Table 1 , Columns 6. Light bars (on the left) refer to interactions with an after- 
2008 dummy and dark bars (on the right) to interactions with the after-2011 dummy. The three areas are licensed areas, licensed areas where shale gas development 

































































u  .2. Robustness 
We will now consider a number of additional specifications to probe
he robustness of our preferred findings. The results are displayed in
able 2 . In column 1, we deflate house prices with a price index for the
en regions used to calculate region-trends with 2008 as base year. In
olumn 2, we include socio-demographic characteristics from the 2001
ensus interacted with a 4 th -order polynomial of year-trends to allow for
ime-variant differences between Output Areas that are not captured by
he output area fixed effects, the limited number of time-variant house
haracteristics or the region-trends. Specifically, we include controls for
he proportion of individuals without basic high school qualifications,
he proportion of highly qualified individuals with a university degree,
he proportion of individuals born in the UK, the proportion of indi-
iduals of white ethnicity, the proportion of employed individuals, the
roportion of individuals who live in social housing, and a measure of
he size of the output area. 
In column 3, we control for an interaction between the Output Areas’
Y-coordinates and a flexible 4 th -order polynomial of year-trends and
n column 4, we interact the house characteristics with year-dummies
o allow them to vary over time. Finally, in column 5, we present the
aseline specification but cluster the standard errors on the level of 76
ravel-to-work areas. 
The results of these modified specifications are very similar to those
escribed in Table 1 . For the 20km buffer in Panel A, we find negative
ouse price effects between 3.0 and 4.2 percent; in Panel B, they range
etween a negative effect of 3.5 and 4.6; in Panel C we find negative
ouse price effects between 3.6 and 4.7 percent; and in Panel D, the
ouse price drop varies between 3.1–4.1 percent. Clustering the stan-
ard errors at a very conservative level increases the standard errors
lightly but our results remain highly significant. Overall, the robustness
hecks give us a most conservative estimate of a 3.0 percent reduction
nd a least conservative effect of 4.7 percent. 9 So far, our regressions have relied on data from the Land Registry
atabase. This is the most comprehensive dataset on property transac-
ions available but it comes with a fairly limited number of house-level
ontrol variables. To assess whether unobserved property characteris-
ics bias our estimates, we present two checks. First, we used data from
oster and Pinchbeck (2018) who employ a fuzzy matching procedure
ased on address and house characteristics to add house characteristics
eported in Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) to the land registry
ata. The control variables include indicators for the wall type, log size
f the house, the number of rooms, a fireplace indicator, the overall
nergy efficiency rating, the floor level, and the number of floors. Sec-
nd, we looked at property transactions from the Nationwide Building
ociety, which includes a more comprehensive set of housing character-
stics and so allows us to control more carefully for physical structure.
owever, this dataset covers only about 15 percent of all transactions
eported in the register data. Accordingly, we are more interested in the
ign and existence of the effects than the exact magnitude. 
Using the land registry data enhanced by additional house charac-
eristics, the negative effect increases significantly and now ranges be-
ween 6.4 and 8.6 percent in license areas that experienced the earth-
uake. This is likely due to the fact the that the matched houses are
ot a random sample of the population. For example, we see that newly
uilt houses are over-represented. Repeating our analysis on the Nation-
ide data yields consistently negative but slightly smaller results that
ange between -1.2 and -3.0 percent in license areas that experienced
he earthquake. However, as might be expected from the even smaller
ample, the individual coefficients are generally less precisely measured
nd more sensitive to the choice of control group and specification. The
ull results using these two datasets are shown in Appendix Table A7. 
Despite our comprehensive set of control variables, it may be the
ase that highly localized shocks are correlated with our different li-
ensing treatments. To account for that, and absorb an extended set of



























































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deflated Census Cont. XY-Trend Char.-Trend Cluster TTWA Deflated Census Cont. XY-Trend Char.-Trend Cluster TTWA 
Panel A: 20km Buffer Panel B:14th Licensing Round w/o 20km Buffer 
After 2008 ∗ License Area 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area 0.005 ∗ ∗ 0.004 ∗ 0.004 ∗ ∗ 0.004 ∗ 0.004 0.016 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.012 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale Gas -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.005 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale Gas 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.005 -0.005 -0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.032 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.033 ∗ ∗ 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.034 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.041 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.035 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.042 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.046 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Observations 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 1,187,630 756,248 756,248 756,248 756,248 756,248 
R-squared 0.815 0.818 0.817 0.996 0.817 0.798 0.803 0.802 0.996 0.802 
Panel C: Licenses issued pre-2008 Panel D: Geology 
After 2008 ∗ License Area 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.005 ∗ ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 -0.005 ∗ -0.005 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.009 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.011 ∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale Gas -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Shale Gas -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
After 2008 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.004 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.002 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) 
After 2011 ∗ License Area ∗ Earthquake -0.036 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.046 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.040 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.041 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.040 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.040 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) 
Observations 517,580 517,580 517,580 517,580 517,580 513,063 513,063 513,063 513,063 513,063 
R-squared 0.826 0.829 0.828 0.996 0.828 0.821 0.822 0.821 0.996 0.821 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
The table reports results from fixed effects regressions of log price on an interaction between an indicator for time which either indicates the post-license period (after 2008) or the post-earthquake period (after 2011) 
and an indicator for (i) licensed areas, (ii) areas licensed for shale gas exploration, or (iii) areas licensed for shale gas exploration where the earthquake happened. All regressions are conditional on quarter-by-year 
fixed effects, house controls, region-by-year fixed effects and geographic characteristics (elevation categories, distance to coast and centers) interacted with year dummies. Panel A-D use the sample restrictions from 
the baseline results in Table 1 . Output areas in the top quartile of the population density distribution and minor and major urban centers are excluded from all specifications. The time horizon is Q1/2005-Q2/2014. 
























































































































22 We also estimated a variant of Eq. 2 and found some evidence that the price 
effects linked with the newspaper coverage were negative only within the area of 
shale-gas bearing geology. This finding supports the idea that local news cover- 
age disseminated information about the fracking events, which depressed prices eractive effect methods as suggested by Gobillon and Magnac (2016) . 21 
eassuringly, we see that flexibly accounting for heterogeneous local
hocks leads to qualitatively similar results. 
In a last exercise, we conduct balancing tests that explores whether
ther observable house characteristics in an Output Area changed
round the time that our treatment areas were licensed in 2008. Our
ain concern would be that the observed price change is being driven
y the sale of lower quality houses rather than by the expectation of
hale gas development. As discussed in Appendix A1.2, we find no in-
ication for such a bias and the few small changes we observe cannot
ossibly account for the price reductions seen in our main estimates. 
. Extensions 
.1. Distance decay effects around preese hall 1 well 
To better understand the extent of the observed effect around the
reese Hall 1 site where the earthquake happened, we now turn to a
et of distance decay models. Fig. 4 shows distance rings set to steps
f 5km from the well that induced the earthquake. We can see that a
aximum distance of 35km includes parts, but not all, of the Bowland
asin (shaded area) which, according to a 2013 study by the British Ge-
logical Survey ( Andrews, 2013 ), holds significant shale gas resources.
heir gas-in-place assessment suggests 37.6 trillion cubic meters (tcm)
nd potentially recoverable resources of 1,800–13,000 billion cubic me-
ers (bcm) at a recovery factor of 8–20% which is common for the US. To
ut this into perspective: DECC suggest an annual UK gas consumption
f 70 bcm for 2014 ( DECC, 2015a ). Holding gas consumption constant,
his would cover at least 25 years. The importance of the Bowland Basin
or UK shale gas development is further underlined by the fact that it is
he only area where shale gas exploration wells have been fracked. Our
istance decay estimations therefore serve two functions. Firstly, if the
stimated price reductions are caused by the Preese Hall 1 earthquakes,
e would expect to see the price effects declining rapidly with distance
rom the drill site. Secondly, any effects at higher distance radii may say
omething about the extent to which the 2011 seismic events spread fear
f fracking into the Bowland Basin area. 
Following Linden and Rockoff (2008) , we start with a series of local
olynomial regressions of house price effects on distance to Preese Hall
 within an area of 40km, split in a period before (dashed line) and af-
er (solid line) the earthquake in 2011. We further distinguish between
reas with (black) or without (grey) the right geological conditions for
racking. The left panel of Fig. 5 shows the results of this exercise. We
ee a pronounced difference between the pre- and post-period within an
rea of 20km. After that, the difference gets smaller and finally disap-
ears at a distance of about 25km from Preese Hall 1. We use this insight
n the following distance decay estimations and compare the 30–35km
in to 5km rings between 0–30km from Preese Hall 1. Formally, we es-
imate the distance decay effect using a slightly modified version of the
stimation equations introduced above: 
𝑛𝑃 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡 + 
∑
𝑟 
𝜏𝑟 ⋅𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑟 × 𝟙 𝑡>𝑄 2 , 2011 + 𝑋 𝑖𝑡 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2)
or distance rings 𝑟 ∈ [0 , 5) , [5 , 10) , [10 , 15) , [15 , 20) , [20 , 25) , [25 , 30) . The
30,35) km ring serves as reference group. In this estimation, 𝜏𝑟 will tell
s the effect of the earthquake shock on house prices in the six different
istance rings thus revealing any distance decay patterns. 
To facilitate interpretation, we present the results of our distance de-
ay regressions in a graph. The right panel of Fig. 5 shows results where
e measure changes in house price effects following the 2011 seismic in-
idences relative to a pre-period from 2005 to 2011 in the distance rings
escribed above. All estimates are reported with 95% confidence inter-
als and standard errors are clustered at the ward level. In line with the




11 ffects up to the 20-25km bin. After that, the effect becomes statistically
nsignificant and slightly positive. Regression tables with the estimated
oefficients can be found in Appendix Table A10, Column 1. 
These figures suggest that there are distinct local impacts, but ex-
ending over a wider range than might be expected if the price effects
epresented a fear of direct impacts from the fracking or earthquakes
t Preese Hall 1. At the same time, the effects are unlikely to represent
 general fear of fracking in the Bowland Basin since Bowland Shale
tretches over a much wider area of North West England (see the shaded
rea in Fig. 4 ). One way to rationalize the extent of the effect is that
ocal media in the earthquake area circulated more information about
racking and its potential risks. Closer inspection of the local media mar-
et reveals that local newspapers are the only media outlet that could
xplain localized variation in access to information about fracking and
arthquakes: local radio stations in this area are too diffuse and they
xtend well beyond the area within which we find price effects in our
istance-decay estimates; there was no local television station in the
rea at this time; and access to online media is again not limited to the
egion. Consequently, we focus on local newspapers’ circulation areas
see Fig. 4 ) and look at the difference between price effects just inside
 zone covered by newspapers local to the Blackpool area, and price ef-
ects outside this zone. The local newspaper coverage zone is explained
bove in the Data section. 
Visual inspection of the circulation area displayed in Fig. 4 sug-
ests that the newspaper area largely overlaps with the area where we
nd house price effects (the newspaper coverage partly extends beyond
5km, but the majority of the 25-35km area is outside their circulation).
o assess a potential newspaper effect more formally, we estimate a set
f boundary regressions where we compare an area inside the newspa-
er circulation area to a control group that is geographically close but
utside the circulation area. Specifically, we estimate: 
𝑛𝑃 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡 + Ψ ⋅𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑖 × 𝟙 𝑡>𝑄 2 , 2011 + 𝑋 𝑖𝑡 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (3)
here the treatment group 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑖 comprises Output Areas within
 buffer zone of 10km (or 5km or 2km) on the inside of the newspa-
er circulation boundary. On the outside of the boundary, we drop an
rea of 10km (or 5km or 2km) to allow for some fuzziness around the
oundary and then define the control group as output areas within the
ext 10km (or 5km or 2km) ring outside the circulation area. The sam-
le in each regression is restricted to the treatment and control group
efined in this way. In the 10km sample, we additionally control for po-
ential heterogeneity in locations that are further away from the bound-
ry by interacting distance to the boundary with an after-2011 dummy.
n specifications with more narrow bands, we cannot separately include
his interaction. 
The results of this specification are presented in Table 3 . For all spec-
fications, we find a negative and highly significant difference between
he area with and without newspaper coverage suggesting that houses
nside the area which have access to local newspapers experience a 2.6
o 5.9 percent house price drop after the 2011 earthquake relative to
he control ring outside the circulation area. An event study within the
0km sample (column 5) further shows a pattern that supports the inter-
retation that more information about the earthquake or about fracking
n general as a consequence of the earthquake is a main driver of the
bserved effect. 22 We do not find any evidence of relevant house price
ifferences around the border before the earthquake. The year 2011 is
he omitted category and from 2012 on, houses within the newspaperpecifically in the areas at risk for future shale gas development. These results 
re, however, rather sensitive to the sample definition and specification so we 
o not report them in detail. 
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Fig. 4. Distance Rings around Preese Hall 1. The fig- 
ures show the location of Preese Hall 1 (red triangle) 
and 5km distance rings around it. The rings go up to 
a distance of 35km from the well. The red blocks in- 
dicate areas licensed under the 13th licensing round 
in 2008 and the shaded area indicates the extent of 
the shale under the NW England Bowland Basin. The 
thick red polygon indicates the circulation area of local 
newspapers. Local newspapers are defined as those six 
newspapers that have a circulation area which covers 
the Preese Hall 1 well site and we define their cover- 
age area as all postcode sectors in which at least 100 
copies were sold.. (For interpretation of the references 
to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to 
the web version of this article.) 
Fig. 5. Distance Decay around Preese Hall 1. Panel A shows the results from local polynomial regressions of house prices (in 1,000-£) on distance from Preese Hall 
1 distinguishing between the period before (solid) and after (dashed) the earthquake incidence in 2011. Panel B shows the estimated coefficients 𝜏𝑟 from Eq. 2 for 


























a  irculation ring sell for 3.0–3.4 percent less than houses in the control
ing. 
In summary, the boundary regressions provide suggestive evidence
hat the observed distance decay effect could be driven by differences
n local media coverage. This finding would be in line with a large body
f literature on the political economy of mass media. 23 However, in
he absence of detailed information on newspaper content, these results
emain suggestive. 
.2. Placebo estimations 
This section presents a series of placebo estimations which provide
urther support for our interpretation that the observed effects are driven23 Prat and Strömberg (2013) summarize the literature on the political econ- 
my of mass media and Snyder and Strömberg (2010) show that local variation 
n press coverage affects citizens’ knowledge. 
B
12 y the fracking-induced earthquake and the subsequent coverage in lo-
al newspapers. In a first placebo exercise, we look at locations across
he UK that experienced earthquakes of similar magnitude (a range be-
ween 1.5 and 2.3) the year before the fracking-induced earthquake
appened, i.e. between 2010/Q1 and 2011/Q1. This leaves us with 22
arthquakes of similar magnitude between 2010/Q1 and 2011/Q1. 24 
n Fig. 7 , Panel A, earthquake locations are indicated by a star symbol.
ooking at the effects of seismic activity that is not caused by fracking
ill help us understand whether the occurrence of an earthquake per se
s considered a disamenity that is reflected in house prices. In a second
lacebo check, we estimate distance decay effects around 61 conven-
ional wells drilled between 2011/Q1 and 2014/Q2. 25 These locations
re indicated by a square symbol in Fig. 6 , Panel B. If there was any24 Data on the magnitude and location of earthquakes are published by the 
ritish Geological Survey in the Bulletin of British Earthquakes for 2010 and 2011. 
25 Information on well drilling is published by DECC. 
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Table 3 
Newspaper Regressions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
10km 10km 5km 2km 10km / Event Study 
After 2011 ∗ Newspaper -0.059 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.036 ∗ ∗ -0.026 ∗ 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
I(year = 2005) ∗ Newspaper 0.035 ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) 
I(year = 2006) ∗ Newspaper 0.055 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.012) 
I(year = 2007) ∗ Newspaper 0.057 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.019) 
I(year = 2008) ∗ Newspaper 0.032 ∗ 
(0.019) 
I(year = 2009) ∗ Newspaper 0.016 
(0.013) 
I(year = 2011) ∗ Newspaper 0.014 
(0.013) 
I(year = 2012) ∗ Newspaper -0.030 ∗ 
(0.018) 
I(year = 2013) ∗ Newspaper -0.029 ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) 
I(year = 2014) ∗ Newspaper -0.034 ∗ 
(0.019) 
Observations 45,648 45,648 42,212 20,336 45,648 
R-squared 0.747 0.747 0.742 0.747 0.747 
Distance to boundary N Y N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
The table reports results from fixed effects regressions of log price on an interaction between an indicator for time which either indicates the post-earthquake period 
(after 2011) and an indicator for the dissemination area of local newspapers. The sample in each regression comprises output areas within a 𝑘 km wide buffer inside 
the newspaper circulation area and adjacent to the boundary (newspaper treatment) and output areas within a 𝑘 km wide buffer outside the newspaper circulation 
area, but separated from the boundary by 𝑘 km (controls). All regressions are conditional on quarter-by-year fixed effects, house controls, region-by-year fixed effects 
and geographic characteristics (elevation categories, distance to coast and centers) interacted with year dummies. Column (2) additionally interacts the log distance 
to the boundary with an after-2011 dummy. Output areas in the top quartile of the population density distribution and minor and major urban centers are excluded 
from all specifications. The time horizon is Q1/2005-Q2/2014. Standard errors are clustered on the ward level. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10 
Fig. 6. Placebo Locations. The shaded areas mark areas with geology that is suitable for shale gas development and the red outlines indicate areas that were licensed 
in 2008. In Panel A, stars indicate the 22 areas that experienced an earthquake of magnitude 1.5-2.3 between 2010/Q1 and 2011/Q1. In Panel B, the 61 squares 
indicate wells that were drilled for conventional oil and gas development between 2011/Q1 and 2014/Q2.. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this 














isamenity related to drilling a well (but not fracking it), this regression
hould reveal it. 
Fig. 7 , Panel A shows the estimated coefficients of the placebo earth-
uakes using regression equation (5). The only difference is that we
nclude an additional set of distance ring-by-year dummies to flexibly
ccount for different house-price trends around earthquake locations.
urther note that we drop all Output Areas within 35km of Preese Hall13  and that we do not consider the intensity of an output area’s earth-
uake exposure – i.e. an output area is treated after the first earthquake
as happened in a given distance and we do not account for additional
arthquake shocks in subsequent periods in the same distance bin. Re-
ression tables with the estimated coefficients can be found in Appendix
able A10, column 2. 
S. Gibbons, S. Heblich and C. Timmins Journal of Urban Economics 122 (2021) 103313 
Fig. 7. Placebo Estimations. The Figure shows the estimated coefficients 𝜏𝑟 from Eq. 2 for placebo earthquake and placebo drill locations enclosed by 95%-confidence 
intervals. The omitted category is the bin (30,35].. 
Fig. 8. Event study. The Figure shows the estimated effects of the event time indicators in Eq. 4 . 𝜔 𝑡 refers to licensed areas (long-dashed line), 𝜋𝑡 to licensed areas 























i  There is no indication of a negative house price effect related to the
arthquakes. This is not surprising since an earthquake of magnitude
.5-2.3 can hardly be felt. This placebo exercise suggests that the post-
racking-earthquake effect we identify is not driven by a general fear of
arthquakes. It is more likely that the earthquakes and media attention
urrounding them made the risks associated with fracking more salient,
nd it is the fear of these risks that is capitalized in house prices. 
In Panel B, we repeat the regression specification used in Panel A
or conventional gas drilling sites. Regression tables with the estimated
oefficients are presented in Appendix Table A10, Column 3. Again we
nd no indication of a negative house price effect related to well-drilling
ctivities. If anything, there is a mildly positive (though highly insignif-
cant) effect in close proximity. This second placebo exercise suggests g  
14 hat well-drilling activities for conventional oil and gas exploration do
ot raise any fear and we do not see any house price reaction. Taken
ogether, these two placebo exercises support our interpretation of the
ffect around Preese Hall 1. The observed effect is either driven by a
ear of future seismic activities induced by fracking or a general fear of
uture fracking which was fueled by numerous media reports after the
arthquake in 2011. 
.3. Event study estimation 
One assumption underlying our difference-in-differences estimations
s that the different control groups will describe how the treated re-
ions would have developed in the absence of licensing. To shed more


































































































29 We contacted the local newspapers but they do not have electronic archives 
that would allow us to quantify the number of articles on fracking-related topics. 
However, the people we contacted said unanimously that there was a strong 
increase in articles about fracking. 
30 Rosen (1974) provides the seminal theoretical analysis. The challenges 
to recovering information on underlying consumer preferences from empiri- 
cal analysis were lately discussed in Heckman et al. (2010) , Bishop and Tim- 
mins (2011) and Yinger (2015) . Recent empirical applications include, to name 
just a few: valuations of air quality ( Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Bajari et al., 
2012 ), water quality ( Walsh et al., 2011; Leggett and Bockstael, 2000 ), school 
quality ( Black, 1999; Gibbons et al., 2013 ), crime (( Gibbons, 2004; Linden and 
Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008a ), or airport noise ( Andersson et al., 2010; Pope, 
2008b ). ight on the price trends before and after the beginning of our treat-
ent period, we present an event study with 2011 as base year and
nteractions between the different license area definitions in the pre-
eriod (2005/Q1-2010/Q1) and the post-period (2011/Q2–2014/Q2).
011/Q1 is the omitted category. 
The estimation equation for these dynamic effects is a modification
f equation (4). Instead of interacting the license, shale gas and earth-
uake dummies with after-2008 and after-2011 dummies, we now in-
eract them with quarter-by-year-indicators, 𝐷 𝑡 , in the pre- and post-
eriods: 
𝑛𝑃 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡 + 
∑
𝑡 ≠𝑄 1 , 2011 
𝜔 𝑡 ⋅ 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖 ×𝐷 𝑡 
+ 
∑
𝑡 ≠𝑄 1 , 2011 
𝜋𝑡 ⋅ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖 ×𝐷 𝑡 + 
+ 
∑
𝑡 ≠𝑄 1 , 2011 
𝜂𝑡 ⋅ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑖 ×𝐷 𝑡 + 𝑋 𝑖𝑡 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4) 
e present the result of the event study for all four specifications in
ig. 8 . The long-dashed line represents the event time indicators 𝜔 𝑡 for
he licensed areas, the short-dashed line the event time indicators 𝜋𝑡 for
he licensed areas where shale gas development was mentioned, and
he solid line represents the event time indicators 𝜂𝑡 for the earthquake
egion. 
From the graph, we do not see a pronounced trend in the license
long-dashed grey line) and shale gas group (short-dashed grey line)
ver time. 26 By contrast, the earthquake group (solid black line) ex-
erienced a significant drop in house prices after the seismic activity
n 2011. 27 Importantly, this effect is persistent for at least two years
efore it starts recovering. However, closer inspection of the shale gas
ime series (short-dashes) shows that shale areas face decreasing house
rices around the same time and if we summed up the effect in the
arthquake area and the areas with shale gas licenses we would see the
verall negative effect continue (see Appendix Fig. A4), suggesting that
ear of fracking and potentially related risks like increased seismic ac-
ivity is not a temporary phenomenon. In the pre-period, we do not see
 strong indication of a trend before 2010, maybe with the exception of
anel B where there is some indication of a decreasing price effect. 28 
owever, since we find broadly similar results for all four control group
efinitions, there is no reason to suspect that this potential pre-trend
ffects our estimations in the post-period. Around 2010, we see the be-
inning of a dip in the earthquake region which might indicate some
isamenity from drilling and fracking activities before the earthquake.
owever, note that this small initial dip is not significant and thus in-
icative at best. 
. Discussion and conclusion 
Research for the US shows that the shale gas boom has boosted prop-
rty prices but there are also rising concerns about negative externalities
inked to the extraction process. In this study, we turned our focus to the
K, where commercial shale gas development has not started, though
eports at the beginning of our study period about substantial shale gas
eserves had sparked hopes for a shale gas boom. At the same time,
uch of the media attention has been on the potential adverse local im-
acts. In the 2008 oil and gas licensing round, fracking became an option
nd some development licenses explicitly mentioned shale gas develop-
ent as a goal. We use the issuing of these licences to test whether the26 The table with detailed coefficients and standard errors is available from the 
uthors upon request. 
27 Overall, the estimates for the earthquake group show a higher variability 
etween quarters due to the smaller number of observations. 
28 To facilitate visual inspection, Appendix Fig. A5 separates the price trends 
or the four sample definitions and the three treatment groups and graphs them 









15 rospect of future share gas development and its associated risks af-
ected property values. Our estimations suggest that on average, areas
hat were licensed for conventional and unconventional oil and gas ex-
loration in 2008 did not experience any house price effects. Looking at
hose areas where shale gas development was mentioned in the license,
e still do not find any evidence that this information was capitalized in
ouse prizes. Only when exploratory hydraulic fracturing caused seis-
ic activity in a subset of shale licensed areas in 2011, do we observe
 house price drop of up to 5 percent. 
Further investigation suggests that local newspapers are likely con-
ributing to this effect. Areas within the circulation area of local news-
apers from the fracking region show stronger house price effects than
 control group just outside their circulation area. We cautiously inter-
ret these results as initial evidence for the role of media in the forma-
ion of house price expectations. Newspaper reports about the tremors
nd the British Geological Survey’s subsequent investigations kept the
opic in people’s minds and might have raised fears about future de-
elopments. This interpretation would be in line with recent work by
ernstein et al. (2019) and Bakkensen and Barrage (2017) but we ad-
ise caution because we lack detailed information about the quantity
nd content of newspaper reports on fracking. 29 We hope to see future
ork that will look more closely into the relationship between newspa-
er information and house price expectations. In the light of our work, it
ould be interesting to understand whether newspapers inform poten-
ial house buyers about relevant risks that should be reflected in their
illingness to pay or whether they raise individuals’ fears thus leading
o exaggerated reactions. 
A long line of theoretical literature on hedonic models and empiri-
al applications has shown that the estimated (net) price effects can be
nterpreted as home-buyers’ marginal willingness to pay to avoid expo-
ure to shale gas development in the vicinity of their homes once they
ave learned about the potential risks. 30 This interpretation requires
ome quite strong assumptions and approximations, but if applied in
ur case it implies that an average household in the earthquake area
ould be willing to pay between £310 and £374 (in 2008-prices) per
ear, depending on the specification in Table 1 and Table 2 , Column 6,
o avoid areas where fracking could induce seismic activity. We use the
mallest (0.039) and largest (0.047) estimated difference-in-difference-
n-difference coefficients to determine the bounds of these back-of-the-
nvelope calculations. 31 Given 22,749 housing transactions in the pe-
iod after the earthquake (i.e., between the third quarter of 2011 and
he second quarter of 2014), we arrive at a cumulative house price loss
elative to control areas that ranges between £141 and £170 million
in 2008-prices) using the triple-difference coefficients. We can think of31 The implicit assumption is that the other estimated effects in license and 
hale areas are potentially spurious trends. If these trends were not spurious, we 
ould compare the effect of the earthquake in licensed shale areas relative to 
on-licensed areas. Put differently, we would sum up the coefficients on License 
rea, Shale and Earthquake after 2011 which would give us coefficients between 
.027–0.045 (i.e. effects between 2.7–4.5 percent). In this case, the average 
ousehold in the earthquake area would be willing to pay between £219 and 
365 (in 2008-prices) per year to avoid areas where fracking induced seismic 
ctivity. 











































































































L  hese numbers as lower bounds because fear of fracking-induced seis-
ic activity does not just affect houses that were sold in that period. It
lso devalued houses that were not sold, and it may even have devalued
and without houses. The 2011 census suggests that there were 145,018
ouseholds in the earthquake area, which implies that the house price
oss could have been more than 6 times larger. Moreover, our distance
ecay specifications suggest that this effect was not limited to areas
here the earthquake happened. 
These local cost calculations naturally raise a question about bene-
ts. As discussed above, we do not think that house prices capitalized
xpectations about local benefits from an economic upswing or com-
unity payments since this was an exploratory stage with commercial
racking still being in the distant future. The more general potential
enefits of shale gas exploration and extraction–lower gas prices and
ower CO 2 emissions relative to other fossil fuels–would not affect our
stimates, since these benefits are national or global so have no impact
n local relative house prices. We refrain form speculating about the
cale of these more general benefits relative to the local costs in Britain,
ecause quantifying the benefits is itself a major challenge and the esti-
ates available are wide ranging depending on the assumptions made.
oreover, as of November 2019, the UK Government announced “an
ndefinite suspension ” of fracking, after new attempts caused additional
remors and the Oil and Gas Authority concluded that it is not possible
o predict the likelihood of their occurrence or magnitude. Evidently the
overnment’s conclusion was that the risks outweighed the benefits and
o a big fracking expansion in the UK is now unlikely. 
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